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| April 15, 2008 |
| Chinese Geopolitics and the Significance of Tibet |
China
is an island. We do not mean it is surrounded by water; we mean China
is surrounded by territory that is difficult to traverse. Therefore,
China is hard to invade; given its size and population, it is even
harder to occupy. This also makes it hard for the Chinese to invade
others; not utterly impossible, but quite difficult. Containing a fifth
of the world's population, China can wall itself off from the world, as
it did prior to the United Kingdom's forced entry in the 19th century
and under Mao Zedong. All of this means China is a great power, but one
that has to behave very differently than other great powers.
Analyzing Chinese Geography
Let's begin simply by analyzing Chinese geography, looking at two maps. The first represents the physical geography of China.
The second shows the population density not only of China, but also of the surrounding countries.
China's
geography is roughly divided into two parts: a mountainous, arid
western part and a coastal plain that becomes hilly at its westward
end. The overwhelming majority of China's population is concentrated in
that coastal plain. The majority of China's territory—the area west of
this coastal plain—is lightly inhabited, however. This eastern region
is the Chinese heartland that must be defended at all cost.
China
as island is surrounded by impassable barriers—barriers that are
difficult to pass or areas that essentially are wastelands with minimal
population. To the east is the Pacific Ocean. To the north and
northwest are the Siberian and Mongolian regions, sparsely populated
and difficult to move through. To the south, there are the hills,
mountains and jungles that separate China from Southeast Asia; to
visualize this terrain, just remember the incredible effort that went
into building the Burma Road during World War II. To the southwest lie
the Himalayas. In the northwest are Kazakhstan and the vast steppes of
Central Asia. Only in the far northeast, with the Russian maritime
provinces and the Yalu River separating China from Korea, are there
traversable points of contacts. But the balance of military power is
heavily in China's favor at these points.
Strategically, China
has two problems, both pivoting around the question of defending the
coastal region. First, China must prevent attacks from the sea. This is
what the Japanese did in the 1930s, first invading Manchuria in the
northeast and then moving south into the heart of China. It is also
what the British and other European powers did on a lesser scale in the
19th century. China's defense against such attacks is size and
population. It draws invaders in and then wears them out, with China
suffering massive casualties and economic losses in the process.
The
second threat to China comes from powers moving in through the
underpopulated portion of the west, establishing bases and moving east,
or coming out of the underpopulated regions around China and invading.
This is what happened during the Mongol invasion from the northwest.
But that invasion was aided by tremendous Chinese disunity, as were the
European and Japanese incursions.
Beijing's Three Imperatives
Beijing therefore has three geopolitical imperatives:- Maintain internal unity so that far powers can't weaken the ability of the central government to defend China.
- Maintain a strong coastal defense to prevent an incursion from the Pacific.
- Secure
China's periphery by anchoring the country's frontiers on impassable
geographical features; in other words, hold its current borders.
In
short, China's strategy is to establish an island, defend its frontiers
efficiently using its geographical isolation as a force multiplier,
and, above all, maintain the power of the central government over the
country, preventing regionalism and factionalism.
We see Beijing
struggling to maintain control over China. Its vast security apparatus
and interlocking economic system are intended to achieve that. We see
Beijing building coastal defenses in the Pacific, including missiles
that can reach deep into the Pacific, in the long run trying to force
the U.S. Navy on the defensive. And we see Beijing working to retain
control over two key regions: Xinjiang and Tibet.
Xinjiang is
Muslim. This means at one point it was invaded by Islamic forces. It
also means that it can be invaded and become a highway into the Chinese
heartland. Defense of the Chinese heartland therefore begins in
Xinjiang. So long as Xinjiang is Chinese, Beijing will enjoy a
1,500-mile, inhospitable buffer between Lanzhou—the westernmost major
Chinese city and its oil center—and the border of Kazakhstan. The
Chinese thus will hold Xinjiang regardless of Muslim secessionists.
The Importance of Tibet to China
Now
look at Tibet on the population density and terrain maps. On the
terrain map one sees the high mountain passes of the Himalayas. Running
from the Hindu Kush on the border with Pakistan to the Myanmar border,
small groups can traverse this terrain, but no major army is going to
thrust across this border in either direction. Supplying a major force
through these mountains is impossible. From a military point of view,
it is a solid wall.
Note that running along the frontier
directly south of this border is one of the largest population
concentrations in the world. If China were to withdraw from Tibet, and
there were no military hindrance to population movement, Beijing fears
this population could migrate into Tibet. If there were such a
migration, Tibet could turn into an extension of India and, over time,
become a potential beachhead for Indian power. If that were to happen,
India's strategic frontier would directly abut Sichuan and Yunnan—the
Chinese heartland.
The Chinese have a fundamental national
interest in retaining Tibet, because Tibet is the Chinese anchor in the
Himalayas. If that were open, or if Xinjiang became independent, the
vast buffers between China and the rest of Eurasia would break down.
The Chinese can't predict the evolution of Indian, Islamic or Russian
power in such a circumstance, and they certainly don't intend to find
out. They will hold both of these provinces, particularly Tibet.
The
Chinese note that the Dalai Lama has been in India ever since China
invaded Tibet. The Chinese regard him as an Indian puppet. They see the
latest unrest in Tibet as instigated by the Indian government, which
uses the Dalai Lama to try to destabilize the Chinese hold on Tibet and
open the door to Indian expansion. To put it differently, their view is
that the Indians could shut the Dalai Lama down if they wanted to, and
that they don't signals Indian complicity.
It should be added
that the Chinese see the American hand behind this as well. Apart from
public statements of support, the Americans and Indians have formed a
strategic partnership since 2001. The Chinese view the United
States—which is primarily focused on the Islamic world—as encouraging
India and the Dalai Lama to probe the Chinese, partly to embarrass them
over the Olympics and partly to increase the stress on the central
government. The central government is stretched in maintaining Chinese
security as the Olympics approach. The Chinese are distracted. Beijing
also notes the similarities between what is happening in Tibet and the
"color" revolutions the United States supported and helped stimulate in
the former Soviet Union.
It is critical to understand that
whatever the issues might be to the West, the Chinese see Tibet as a
matter of fundamental national security, and they view pro-Tibetan
agitation in the West as an attempt to strike at the heart of Chinese
national security. The Chinese are therefore trapped. They are staging
the Olympics in order to demonstrate Chinese cohesion and progress. But
they must hold on to Tibet for national security reasons, and therefore
their public relations strategy is collapsing. Neither India nor the
United States is particularly upset that the Europeans are thinking
about canceling attendance at various ceremonies.
A Lack of Countermoves
China
has few countermoves to this pressure over Tibet. There is always talk
of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That is not going to happen—not
because China doesn't want to, but because it does not have the naval
capability of seizing control of the Taiwan Straits or seizing air
superiority, certainly not if the United States doesn't want it (and we
note that the United States has two carrier battle groups in the Taiwan
region at the moment). Beijing thus could bombard Taiwan, but not
without enormous cost to itself and its own defensive capabilities. It
does not have the capability to surge forces across the strait, much
less to sustain operations there in anything short of a completely
permissive threat environment. The Chinese could fire missiles at
Taiwan, but that risks counterstrikes from American missiles. And, of
course, Beijing could go nuclear, but that is not likely given the
stakes. The most likely Chinese counter here would be trying to isolate
Taiwan from shipping by firing missiles. But that again assumes the
United States would not respond—something Beijing can't count on.
While
China thus lacks politico-military options to counter the Tibet
pressure, it also lacks economic options. It is highly dependent for
its economic well-being on exports to the United States and other
countries; drawing money out of U.S. financial markets would require
Beijing to put it somewhere else. If the Chinese invested in Europe,
European interest rates would go down and U.S. rates would go up, and
European money would pour into the United States. The long-held fear of
the Chinese withdrawing their money from U.S. markets is therefore
illusory: The Chinese are trapped economically. Far more than the
United States, they can't afford a confrontation.
That leaves
the pressure on Tibet, and China struggling to contain it. Note that
Beijing's first imperative is to maintain China's internal coherence.
China's great danger is always a weakening of the central government
and the development of regionalism. Beijing is far from losing control,
but recently we have observed a set of interesting breakdowns. The
inability to control events in Tibet is one. Significant shortages of
diesel fuel is a second. Shortages of rice and other grains is a third.
These are small things, but they are things that should not be
happening in a country as well-heeled in terms of cash as China is, and
as accustomed as it is to managing security threats.
China must
hold Tibet, and it will. The really interesting question is whether the
stresses building up on China's central administration are beginning to
degrade its ability to control and manage events. It is easy to
understand China's obsession with Tibet. The next step is to watch
China trying to pick up the pieces on a series of administrative
miscues. That will give us a sense of the state of Chinese affairs.
Stratfor
is a private intelligence company delivering in-depth analysis,
assessments and forecasts on global geopolitical, economic, security
and public policy issues. A variety of subscription-based access, free
intelligence reports and confidential consulting are available for
individuals and corporations.
Click here to take advantage of 50% OFF regular subscription rates - offered exclusively for BillOReilly.com readers. |
| Posted by George Friedman, Stratfor.com at 4:23 PM - Link to this entry
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| April 14, 2008 |
| This week's new O'Quiz is up |
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| Posted by BillOReilly.com Staff at 3:56 PM - Link to this entry
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| April 8, 2008 |
| A Mystery in the Middle East |
The
Arab-Israeli region of the Middle East is filled with rumors of war.
That is about as unusual as the rising of the sun, so normally it would
not be worth mentioning. But like the proverbial broken clock that is
right twice a day, such rumors occasionally will be true. In this case,
we don't know that they are true, and certainly it's not the rumors
that are driving us. But other things-minor and readily explicable
individually-have drawn our attention to the possibility that something
is happening.
The first thing that drew our attention was a
minor, routine matter. Back in February, the United States started
purchasing oil for its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The SPR is a
reserve of crude oil stored in underground salt domes. Back in
February, it stood at 96.2 percent of capacity, which is pretty full as
far as we are concerned. But the U.S. Department of Energy decided to
increase its capacity. This move came in spite of record-high oil
prices and the fact that the purchase would not help matters. It also
came despite potential political fallout, since during times like these
there is generally pressure to release reserves. Part of the step could
have been the bureaucracy cranking away, and part of it could have been
the feeling that the step didn't make much difference. But part of it
could have been based on real fears of a disruption in oil supplies. By
itself, the move meant nothing. But it did cause us to become
thoughtful.
Also in February, someone assassinated Imad
Mughniyah, a leader of Hezbollah, in a car bomb explosion in Syria. It
was assumed the Israelis had killed him, although there were some
suspicions the Syrians might have had him killed for their own arcane
reasons. In any case, Hezbollah publicly claimed the Israelis killed
Mughniyah, and therefore it was expected the militant Shiite group
would take revenge. In the past, Hezbollah responded not by attacking
Israel but by attacking Jewish targets elsewhere, as in the Buenos
Aires attacks of 1992 and 1994.
In March, the United States
decided to dispatch the USS Cole, then under Sixth Fleet command, to
Lebanese coastal waters. Washington later replaced it with two escorts
from the Nassau (LHA-4) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), reportedly
maintaining a minor naval presence in the area. (Most of the ESG, on a
regularly scheduled deployment, is no more than a few days sail from
the coast, as it remains in the Mediterranean Sea.) The reason given
for the American naval presence was to serve as a warning to the
Syrians not to involve themselves in Lebanese affairs. The exact
mission of the naval presence off the Levantine coast-and the exact
deterrent function it served-was not clear, but there they were. The
Sixth Fleet has gone out of its way to park and maintain U.S. warships
off the Lebanese coast.
Hezbollah leaders being killed by the
Israelis and the presence of American ships off the shores of
Mediterranean countries are not news in and of themselves. These things
happen. The killing of Mughniyah is notable only to point out that as
much as Israel might have wanted him dead, the Israelis knew this fight
would escalate. But anyone would have known this. So all we know is
that whoever killed Mughniyah wanted to trigger a conflict. The U.S.
naval presence off the Levantine coast is notable in that Washington,
rather busy with matters elsewhere, found the bandwidth to get involved
here as well.
With the situation becoming tense, the Israelis
announced in March that they would carry out an exercise in April
called Turning Point 2. Once again, an Israeli military exercise is
hardly interesting news. But the Syrians apparently got quite
interested. After the announcement, the Syrians deployed three
divisions-two armored, one mechanized-to the Lebanese-Syrian border in
the Bekaa Valley, the western part of which is Hezbollah's stronghold.
The Syrians didn't appear to be aggressive. Rather, they deployed these
forces in a defensive posture, in a way walling off their part of the
valley.
The Syrians are well aware that in the event of a
conventional war with Israel, they would experience a short but
exciting life, as they say. They thus are hardly going to attack
Israel. The deployment therefore seemed intended to keep the Israelis
on the Lebanese side of the border-on the apparent assumption the
Israelis were going into the Bekaa Valley. Despite Israeli and Syrian
denials of the Syrian troop buildup along the border, Stratfor sources
maintain that the buildup in fact happened. Normally, Israel would be
jumping at the chance to trumpet Syrian aggression in response to these
troop movements, but, instead, the Israelis downplayed the buildup.
When
the Israelis kicked off Turning Point 2, which we regard as a pretty
interesting name, it turned out to be the largest exercise in Israeli
history. It involved the entire country, and was designed to test civil
defenses and the ability of the national command authority to continue
to function in the event of an attack with unconventional
weapons-chemical and nuclear, we would assume. This was a costly
exercise. It also involved calling up reserves, some of them for the
exercise, and, by some reports, others for deployment to the north
against Syria. Israel does not call up reserves casually. Reserve
call-ups are expensive and disrupt the civilian economy. These appear
small, but in the environment of Turning Point 2, it would not be
difficult to mobilize larger forces without being noticed.
The
Syrians already were deeply concerned by the Israeli exercise.
Eventually, the Lebanese government got worried, too, and started to
evacuate some civilians from the South. Hezbollah, which still hadn't
retaliated for the Mughniyah assassination, also claimed the Israelis
were about to attack it, and reportedly went on alert and mobilized its
forces. The Americans, who normally issue warnings and cautions to
everyone, said nothing to try to calm the situation. They just sat
offshore on their ships.
It is noteworthy that Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak canceled a scheduled visit to Germany this week.
The cancellation came immediately after the reports of the Syrian
military redeployment were released. Obviously, Barak needed to be in
Israel for Turning Point 2, but then he had known about the exercise
for at least a month. Why cancel at the last minute? While we are
discussing diplomacy, we note that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
visited Oman-a country with close relations with Iran-and then was
followed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. By itself not
interesting, but why the high-level interest in Oman at this point?
Now
let's swing back to September 2007, when the Israelis bombed something
in Syria near the Turkish border. As we discussed at the time, for some
reason the Israelis refused to say what they had attacked. It made no
sense for them not to trumpet what they carefully leaked-namely, that
they had attacked a nuclear facility. Proving that Syria had a secret
nuclear program would have been a public relations coup for Israel.
Nevertheless, no public charges were leveled. And the Syrians remained
awfully calm about the bombing.
Rumors now are swirling that the
Israelis are about to reveal publicly that they in fact bombed a
nuclear reactor provided to Syria by North Korea. But this news isn't
all that big. Also rumored is that the Israelis will claim Iranian
complicity in building the reactor. And one Israeli TV station reported
April 8 that Israel really had discovered Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction, which it said had been smuggled to Syria.
Now
why the Bush administration wouldn't have trumpeted news of the Syrian
reactor worldwide in September 2007 is beyond us, but there obviously
were some reasons-assuming the TV report is true, which we have no way
of establishing. In fact, we have no idea why the Israelis are choosing
this moment to rehash the bombing of this site. But whatever their
reason, it certainly raises a critical question. If the Syrians are
developing a nuclear capability, what are the Israelis planning to do
about it?
No one of these things, by itself, is of very great
interest. And taken together they do not provide the means for a clear
forecast. Nevertheless, a series of rather ordinary events, taken
together, can constitute something significant. Tensions in the Middle
East are moving well beyond the normal point, and given everything that
is happening, events are moving to a point where someone is likely to
take military action. Whether Hezbollah will carry out a retaliatory
strike or Israel a pre-emptive strike in Lebanon, or whether the
Israelis' real target is Iran, tensions systematically have been
ratcheted up to the point where we, in our simple way, are beginning to
wonder whether something has to give.
All together, these events
are fairly extraordinary. Ignoring all rhetoric-and the Israelis have
gone out of their way to say that they are not looking for a fight-it
would seem that each side, but particularly the Americans and Israelis,
have gone out of their way to signal that they are expecting conflict.
The Syrians have also signaled that they expect conflict, and Hezbollah
always claims there is about to be conflict.
What is missing
is this: who will fight whom, and why, and why now. The simple
explanation is that Israel wants a second round with Hezbollah. But
while that might be true, it doesn't explain everything else that has
happened. Most important, it doesn't explain the simultaneous
revelations about the bombing of Syria. It also doesn't explain the
U.S. naval deployment. Is the United States about to get involved in a
war with Hezbollah, a war that the Israelis should handle themselves?
Are the Israelis going to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad-and
then wind up with a Sunni government, or worse, an Israeli occupation
of Syria? None of that makes a lot of sense.
In truth, all of
this may dissolve into nothing much. In intelligence analysis, however,
sometimes a set of not-fully-coherent facts must be reported, and that
is what we are doing now. There is no clear pattern; there is no
obvious direction this is taking. Nevertheless, when we string together
events from February until now, we see a persistently escalating
pattern of behavior. In fact, what we can say most clearly is that
there is escalation, without being able to say what is the clear
direction of the escalation or the purpose.
We would like to
wrap this up with a crystal clear explanation and forecast. But we
can't. The motives of the various actors are opaque; and taken
separately, the individual events all have quite innocent explanations.
We are not prepared to say war is imminent, nor even what sort of war
there would be. We are simply prepared to say that the course of events
since February-and really since the September 2007 attack on Syria-have
been startling, and they appear to be reaching some sort of
hard-to-understand crescendo.
The bombing of Syria symbolizes
our confusion. Why would Syria want a nuclear reactor and why put it on
the border of Turkey, a country the Syrians aren't particularly
friendly with? If the Syrians had a nuclear reactor, why would the
Israelis be coy about it? Why would the Americans? Having said nothing
for months apart from careful leaks, why are the Israelis going to
speak publicly now? And if what they are going to say is simply that
the North Koreans provided the equipment, what's the big deal? That was
leaked months ago.
The events of September 2007 make no sense
and have never made any sense. The events we have seen since February
make no sense either. That is noteworthy, and we bring it to your
attention. We are not saying that the events are meaningless. We are
saying that we do not know their meaning. But we can't help but regard
them as ominous.
Stratfor
is a private intelligence company delivering in-depth analysis,
assessments and forecasts on global geopolitical, economic, security
and public policy issues. A variety of subscription-based access, free
intelligence reports and confidential consulting are available for
individuals and corporations.
Click here to take advantage of 50% OFF regular subscription rates - offered exclusively for BillOReilly.com readers. |
| Posted by George Friedman, Stratfor.com at 5:06 PM - Link to this entry
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| April 7, 2008 |
| This week's new O'Quiz is up |
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| Posted by BillOReilly.com Staff at 11:45 AM - Link to this entry
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| April 2, 2008 |
| New Backstage Conversation up now |
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| April 1, 2008 |
| Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus |
For
the past year, Stratfor has been focusing on what we see as the
critical global geopolitical picture. As the U.S.-jihadist war has
developed, it has absorbed American military resources dramatically. It
is overstated to say that the United States lacks the capacity to
intervene anywhere else in the world, but it is not overstated to say
that the United States cannot make a major, sustained intervention
without abandoning Iraq. Thus, the only global power has placed almost
all of its military chips in the Islamic world.
Exploiting U.S. Distractions
Russia
has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military
posture to attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the
former Soviet Union. To this end, Russia has taken advantage of its
enhanced financial position-due to soaring commodity prices,
particularly in the energy sector-as well as a lack of American options
in the region.
The Russians do not have any interest in
re-establishing the Soviet Union, nor even in controlling the internal
affairs of most of the former Soviet republics. Moscow does want to do
two things, however. First, it wants to coordinate commodity policies
across the board to enhance Russian leverage. Second, and far more
important, it wants to limit U.S. and European influence in these
countries. Above all, Russia does not want to see NATO expand any
further-and Moscow undoubtedly would like to see a NATO rollback,
particularly in the Baltic states.
From a strategic point of
view, the United States emerged from the Cold War with a major
opportunity. Since it is not in the United States' interests to have
any great power emerge in Eurasia, making certain that Russia did not
re-emerge as a Eurasian hegemon clearly was a strategic goal of the
United States. The Soviet disintegration did not in any way guarantee
that it would not re-emerge in another form.
The United States
pursued this goal in two ways. The first was by seeking to influence
the nature of the Russian regime, trying to make it democratic and
capitalist under the theory that democratic and capitalist nations did
not engage in conflict with democratic and capitalist countries.
Whatever the value of the theory, what emerged was not democracy and
capitalism but systemic chaos and decomposition. The Russians
ultimately achieved this state on their own, though the United States
and Europe certainly contributed.
The second way Washington
pursued this goal was by trying to repeat the containment of the Soviet
Union with a new containment of Russia. Under this strategy, the United
States in particular executed a series of moves with the end of
expanding U.S. influence in the countries surrounding Russia. This
strategy's capstone was incorporating new countries into NATO, or
putting them on the path to NATO membership.
NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions
The
Baltic states were included, along with the former Soviet empire in
Central Europe. But the critical piece in all of this was Ukraine. If
Ukraine were included in NATO or fell under Western influence, Russia's
southern flank would become indefensible. NATO would be a hundred miles
from Volgograd, formerly known as Stalingrad. NATO would also be less
than a hundred miles from St. Petersburg. In short, Russia would become
a strategic cripple.
The U.S. strategy was to encourage
pro-American, democratic movements in the former Soviet Republics-the
so-called "color revolutions." The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was the
breaking point in U.S.-Russian relations. The United States openly
supported the pro-Western democrats in Ukraine. The Russians
(correctly) saw this as a direct and deliberate challenge by the United
States to Russian national security. In their view, the United States
was using the generation of democratic movements in Ukraine to draw
Ukraine into the Western orbit and ultimately into NATO.
Having
their own means of influence in Ukraine, the Russians intervened
politically to put a brake on the evolution. The result was a stalemate
that Russia appeared destined to win by dint of U.S. preoccupation with
the Islamic world, Russian proximity, and the fact that Russia had an
overwhelming interest in Ukraine while the Americans had only a distant
interest.
U.S. interest might have been greater than the
Russians thought. The Americans have watched the re-emergence of Russia
as a major regional power. It is no global superpower, but it certainly
has regained its position as a regional power, reaching outside of its
own region in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Iranians and Germans
must both take Russia into account as they make their calculations. The
Russian trajectory is thus clear. They may never be a global power
again, but they are going to be a power that matters.
The Closing Window
It
is far easier for the United States to prevent the emergence of a
regional hegemon than to control one that has already emerged.
Logically, the United States wants to block the Russian re-emergence,
but Washington is running out of time. Indeed, one might say that the
Americans are already out of time. Certainly, the United States must
act now or else accept Russia as a great power and treat it as such.
This
is why U.S. President George W. Bush has gone to Ukraine. It is
important to recall that Bush's trip comes in the context of an
upcoming NATO summit, where the United States has called for beginning
the process that will include Ukraine-as well as Georgia and other
Balkan powers-in NATO. Having gone relatively quiet on the issue of
NATO expansion since the Orange Revolution, the United States now has
become extremely aggressive. In traveling to Ukraine to tout NATO
membership, Bush is directly challenging the Russians on what they
regard as their home turf.
Clearly, the U.S. window of
opportunity is closing: Russian economic, political and military
influence in Ukraine is substantial and growing, while the U.S. ability
to manipulate events in Ukraine is weak. But Bush is taking a risky
step. First, Bush doesn't have full NATO support, which he needs since
NATO requires unanimity in these issues. Several important NATO
countries-particularly Germany-have opposed this expansion on technical
merits that are hard to argue with. Germany's stance is that not only
is Ukraine not militarily ready to start meaningful membership talks,
but that the majority of its population opposes membership in the first
place.
Assuming Bush isn't simply making an empty gesture for
the mere pleasure of irritating the Russians, the United States clearly
feels it can deal with German objections if it creates the proper
political atmosphere in Ukraine. Put another way, Bush feels that if he
can demonstrate that the Russians are impotent, that their power is
illusory, he can create consensus in NATO. Russia's relatively weak
response over Kosovo has been taken by Washington and many in Europe
(particularly Central Europe) as a sign of Russian weakness. Bush wants
to push the advantage now, since he won't have a chance later. So the
visit has been shaped as a direct challenge to Russia. Should Moscow
fail to take up the challenge, the dynamics of the former Soviet Union
will be changed.
The Russians have three possible
countermoves. The first is to use the Federal Security Service (FSB),
its intelligence service, to destabilize Ukraine. Russia has many
assets in Ukraine, and Russia is good at this game. Second, Russia can
use its regional military power to demonstrate that the United States
is the one bluffing. And third, Russia can return the favor to the
Americans in a place that will hurt very badly; namely, in the Middle
East-and particularly in Iran and Syria. A decision to engage in
massive transfers of weapons, particularly advanced anti-aircraft
systems, would directly hurt the United States.
Of these
options, the first is certainly the most feasible. Not only is it where
the Russians excel-and will such a strategy leave few fingerprints and
produce results quickly-but the other two options risk consolidating
the West into a broad anti-Russian coalition that may well return the
favor across the entire Russian periphery. The latter two options would
also commit much of Russia's resources to a confrontation with the
West, leaving precious little to hedge against other powers, most
notably a China which is becoming more deeply enmeshed in Central Asia
by the day.
The Middle East Connection
Still, the
United States must focus on where most of its troops are fighting. It
would thus appear that provoking the Russians is a dangerous game. This
is why events in Iraq this week have been particularly interesting. A
massive battle broke out between two Shiite factions in Iraq. One, led
by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim-who effectively controls Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki due to the small size and fractured nature of
al-Maliki's party-confronted the faction led by Muqtada al-Sadr.
Clearly, this was an attempt by the dominant Shiite faction to finally
deal with the wild card of Iraqi Shiite politics. By the weekend,
al-Sadr had capitulated. Backed into a corner by overwhelming forces,
apparently backed by U.S. military force, al-Sadr effectively sued for
peace.
Al-Sadr's decision to lay down arms was heavily
influenced by the Iranians. We would go further and say the decision to
have al-Sadr submit to a government dominated by his Shiite rivals was
a decision made with Iranian agreement. The Iranians had been
restraining al-Sadr for a while, taking him to Tehran and urging him to
return to the seminary to establish his clerical credentials. The
Iranians did not want to see a civil war among the Iraqi Shia. A split
among the Shia at a time of increasing Sunni unity and cooperation with
the United States would open the door to a strategically unacceptable
outcome for Iran: a pro-American government heavily dominated by Sunnis
with increasing military power as the Shia are fighting among
themselves.
The Americans also didn't want this outcome. While
the Iranians had restrained al-Sadr at the beginning of the U.S.
surge-and thereby massively contributed to the end of the strategy of
playing the Sunnis against the Shia-Tehran had not yet dealt with
al-Sadr decisively. Just like Iran, the United States prefers not to
see a new Sunni government emerge in Iraq. Instead, Washington wants a
balance of power in Baghdad between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, and it
wants intra-communal disputes to be contained within this framework. If
a stable government is to emerge, each of the communities must be
relatively (with an emphasis on "relatively") stable. Thus, not for the
first time, American and Iranian interests in Iraq were aligned. Both
wanted an end to Shiite conflict, and that meant that both wanted
al-Sadr to capitulate.
This is the point where U.S. and Iranian
interests can diverge. The Iranians have a fundamental decision to
make, and what happens now in Iraq is almost completely contingent upon
what the Iranians decide. They can do three things. First, they can
hold al-Sadr in reserve as a threat to stability if things don't go
their way. Second, they can use the relative unity of the Shia to try
to impose an anti-Sunni government in Baghdad. And third, they can
participate in the creation of that government.
We have long
argued that the Iranians would take the third option. They certainly
appeared to be cooperating in the last week. But it has not been clear
what the U.S. government thought, partly because they have been
deliberately opaque in their thinking on Iran, and partly because the
situation was too dynamic.
Bush's Long Shot
It is
the decision to visit Ukraine and challenge the Russians on their front
porch that gives us some sense of Washington's thinking. To challenge
Moscow at a time when the Russians might be able to support Iran in
causing a collapse in the Iraqi process would not make sense. The U.S.
challenge is a long shot anyway, and risking a solution in Iraq by
giving the Iranians a great power ally like Russia would seem too much
of a risk to take.
But Bush is going to Ukraine and is
challenging the Russians on NATO. This could mean he does not think
Russia has any options in the Middle East. It also could mean that he
has become sufficiently confident that the process (let's not call it a
relationship) that has emerged with the Iranians is robust enough that
Tehran will not sink it now in exchange for increased Russian support,
and that while a crisis with Syria is simmering, the Russians will not
destabilize the situation there-Syria lacks the importance that Iran
holds for U.S. strategy in Iraq, anyway.
Bush's decision to go
to Ukraine indicates that he feels safe in opening a new front-at least
diplomatically-while an existing military front remains active. That
move makes no sense, particularly in the face of some European
opposition, unless he believes the Russians are weaker than they appear
and that the American position in Iraq is resolving itself. Bush
undoubtedly would have liked to have waited for greater clarity in
Iraq, but time is almost up. The Russians are moving now, and the
United States can either confront them now or concede the game until
the United States is in a military position to resume Russian
containment. Plus, Bush doesn't have any years left in office to wait.
The
global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing.
Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the
only global power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its
foreign policy and confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its
interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires deftness
and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot
of cards to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. Bush
is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East as well as increasing
pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the risk or he
thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an
important moment.
Stratfor
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| Posted by George Friedman, Stratfor.com at 2:06 PM - Link to this entry
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